Investigate the relationship between busy managers and earnings management with emphasis on the role of corporate governance at listed companies in Tehran Stock Exchange
Subject Areas : GeneralAmeneh Bazrafshan 1 * , Aynaz Khorasanian 2
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Keywords: busy managers, earnings management, corporate governance, General policies of the system,
Abstract :
There are controversial views about the implications of the use of busy managers on the board. Therefore, the purpose of this research is to investigate the relationship between busy managers and earnings management with an emphasis on the role of corporate governance. The data required for this study included 90 companies that were accepted in Tehran Stock Exchange during the years 2011-2017. Results based on regression models show that busy managers have a negative and significant effect on real earnings management. In this way, employing busy managers on the board reduces the real earnings management and, consequently, increases the quality of earnings. However, there is not a meaningful relationship between the number of busy managers and accrual earnings management. In addition, the findings suggest that corporate governance does not have a significant effect on the relationship between busy managers with earnings management. In sum, the findings provide empirical evidence on overall employment policies
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